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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
they come to be associated solely with a particular business or product."1 The
Court held it was probable that, because of the extensive advertising and long
period of doing business, secondary meaning had attached to the words and symbol
in issue and were understood in the locality involved to refer solely to plaintiff's
business; thus there was a probability of resultant deception.
In reaching the particular conclusions as to intent and probability of deception, the Court acted correctly, for no other conclusions could reasonably be
inferred from the facts presented in plaintiff's affidavits.
Workmen's Compensafion-Non-Scheduled Adjusfmenfs
A lump sum non-scheduled adjustment of future compensation as provided
for under section 15 (5-b) of the Workmen's Compensation Law0 2 is binding
on neither the employer nor the employee until it has been approved by the
63
Workmen's Compensation Board.
In Zielinski v. General Motors Corporatiop,64 the question arose as to when
such approval may be considered to have been rendered. The employer and
the employee had made such an agreement and upon application to the Workmen's Compensation Board, "tentative" approval was obtained. Prior to the issuance of a written opinion, the employee died. The employer, unaware of this
fact, sent a check to the deceased employee for the amount of the agreed adjustment upon receipt of the Board's approval. The deceased employee's wife, as
administratrix, deposited the check to the account of the estate. In this action
of interpleader, 5 wherein both the employer and the administratrix claimed
the right to the funds, the Court held (4-3), reversing the Appellate Division,60
that the deceased employee's estate had no right to the proceeds of the check.
Though a wife can recover any compensation due her husband at the time
of his death,6 7 it is an elementary principle that the estate of a deceased person
61. G. c C. Merrison Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed, 369 (6th Cir. 1912), aff'd.
and modified, 238 Fed. 1 (6th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 243 U. S. 651 (1917).
62. N. Y. WORKIMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §15 (5-b). Non-scheduled Adjustments. . . . The board may, in the interests of justice, approve a non-schedule
adjustment agreed to between the claimant and the employer or his Insurance

carrier.

63. Dodson v. Healy Co., 275 App. Div. 130, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 410 (3d Dep't 1949),
leave to appeal den., 300 N. Y. 760, 88 N. E. 2d 534 (1949).
64. 1 N. Y. 2d 424, 135 N. E. 2d 808 (1956).
65. N. Y.Civ. PRAc. Acr §285; A bank may maintain interpleader where the
controversy is with respect to a deposit. Herpe v. Herpe, 225 N. Y. 323, 122 N. E.
204 (1919).
66. Zielinski v. General Motors Corporation, 285 App. Div. 407, 143 N. Y. S.
2d 228 (4th Dep't 1955).
67.

N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §33.... (I)n the case of the death

of an injured employee to whom there was due at the time of his or her death
any compensation under the provisions of this chapter, the amount of such compensation shall be payable to the surviving wife or husband....
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cannot recover upon a cause of action which had not accrued to the deceased
prior to his death.68 It is a similarly basic proposition that a person who pays
money under a mistake of fact may recover from the payee.6 9 Since the adjustment was a future compensation, the deceased employee's right to this money
at the time of his death necessarily depended upon the agreement between him
and his employer. The question, therefore, resolves itself to a determination of
when the agreement was "approved".
It has been held that the formal writing of an opinion is merely an administrative function and that the time of approval is the date upon which it is
actually pronounced.70 In the instant case, however, only "tentative" approval
was given prior to the death of the employee. This would tend to indicate that
the Board intended to postpone its approval until the date of its formal written
opinion and thus support the holding of the majority. Were this the only consideration, no further examination of the law would be necessary. The dissent,
however, raises a point which, although not pursuasive to this writer, is worthy
of more than passing notice.
The awards of the Workmen's Compensation Board, as opposed to the determinations of other administrative bodies, are not subject to review except
through an appeal. 71 In this respect they are quite similar to judgments. Section
478 of the Civil Practice Act states in effect that where there has been an offer
to allow judgment and the party making such an offer dies prior to the rendering of judgment, a judgment may be entered in the names of the original
parties.72 By analogy it would seem that a person who has submitted a nonscheduled adjustment to the Workmen's Compensation Board for approval has
"made an offer to allow judgment". Here the analogy ends, however. In the
ordinary action it is not inconsistant to enter such a judgment since the decedents
estate could maintain an action in his behalf.r However, in the situation at
hand, as pointed out above, the deceased employee's cause of action depended
upon approval by the Board which was not forthcoming until after the death
of the employee. The Workmen's Compensation Board has no provision similar
68. Fontheim v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 257 App. Div. 147, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 90
(1st Dep't 1939), appeal den., 281 N. Y. 392, 24 N. E. 2d 95 (1939) apeal dismissed, 289 N. Y. 624, 43 N. E. 2d 840 (1942).
69. Schleider v. Maryland Casualty Co., 226 App. Div. 50, 234 N. Y. Supp.
144 (1st Dep't 1929), aff'd., 252 N. Y. 598, 170 N. E. 158 (1930).
70. See note 63 supra.
71. Doca v. Federal gtevedoring Co., 280 App. Div. 940, 116 N. Y. S. 2d 25
(2d Dep't 1952), aff'd., 305 N. Y. 648, 112 N. E. 2d 424 (1953).
72. N. Y. Cirv. PRAc. Acr §478. If either party to an action dies after an
accepted offer to allow judgment to be taken or after a verdict, report or decision,

or an interlocutory judgment, but before final judgment is entered, the court

must enter final judgment in the names of the original parties unless the offer,
verdict, report or decision is set aside. . . (A) judgment shall not be entered
against a party who dies before a verdict, report or decision is actually rendered
against him....
73. N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW §§116, 119.
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to section 478. It would therefore seem inconsistant to invoke a section addressed
to an ordinary cause of action in the case at hand. To do so would in effect give
the estate a right which the decedent himself did not have at his death.
Credifors Rights-Aftorney's Lien
The lien of an attorney is an equitable right to be paid for his services out
of the proceeds of the judgment or other proceeding which has been obtained
by his labor and skill. The lien exists from the commencement of an action
and attaches to a verdict in his client's favor, including the proceeds thereof into
whatever hands they may come. This lien cannot be affected by any settlement
between the parties before or after the judgment. 74 In order to supersede an at75
torney's lien a claim must be a prior charge against the specific fund.
In Industrial Comm'r. v. W. E. Hedger Transp. Corp.,76 the Court of Appeals
dismissed a turnover order 77 directing the Aluminum Company of Canada to
pay the commissioner $2,100 out of an amount the company had agreed to pay
appellant-attorney for his attorney's fee for Hedger in procuring a settlement
of an action brought by Hedger against Aluminum. Hedger agreed to settle its
claim if Aluminum would pay its attorney's fee to appellant. The commissioner
moved for a turnover order directing payment of a part of the sum to satisfy
the State's judgments for unpaid unemployment insurance payments from
Hedger. The appellant opposed the issuance of such an order on the grounds
that the settlement agreement between Hedger and Aluminum invested him
with ownership of the sum and, therefore, that the fund was not the property
of Hedger and thus could not be the subject of this third party proceeding.
The Appellate Division affirmed a determination in favor of the commissioner. 78
The majority of the Court of Appeals held that the appellant was the solo
beneficiary of the agreement between Aluminum and Hedger, in consideration
of his procuring a release and discontinuance of the Hedger suit, and thus he
had title to the whole amount. Alternatively, they held that he possessed his
equitable attorney's lien from the time of the commencement of the suit upon
the recovery therein, with priority over any later-attaching tax or other lien;
further, his actions did not show a waiver nor amount to an estoppel.
The dissenting judges contended that the appellant had waived his lien
by not asserting it in the third party proceeding and that he was relying solely
upon his claim to title' to the fund. They were of the opinion that he was a
74. N. Y. JUDICIARY LAv §475.
75. Bacon v. Schlesinger, 171 App. Div. 503, 157 N. Y. Supp. 649 (1st Dep't
1916).
76. 1 N. Y. 2d 503, 136 N. E. 2d 524 (1956).

77. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §794.
78. Industrial Comm'r. v. W. E. Hedger Transp. Corp., 286 App. Div. 1009,

146 N. Y. S. 2d 662 (1st Dep't 1955).

